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FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: THE COURT’S
APPLICATION OF THE SECOND MONTANA
EXCEPTION TO UNITED STATES V. COOLEY
Lauren Moose*

I. INTRODUCTION
“[P]erhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law . . . is the principle
that those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in
general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather
inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”
–Felix S. Cohen1

As of 2022, the United States Department of the Interior Indian Affairs
recognizes 574 tribes.2 All 574 of these federally recognized tribes relate to
the United States on a sovereign-to-sovereign level.3 Tribal sovereignty and
its accompanying inherent rights and powers preexist the formation of the
United States of America and are retained unless expressly limited by Congress.4 In United States v. Cooley,5 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the right to temporarily detain and search non-Indians6 on public
rights-of-way running through tribal reservations is a retained aspect of tribal authority.7 The Court could have concluded that, by virtue of their inherent sovereign authority, tribes continue to possess the right to temporarily detain and investigate non-Indians within the exterior boundaries of Indian country because Congress never divested this right and tribes never
* Lauren Moose is a 2022 graduate of the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University
of Montana. The author thanks Dimitrios Tsolakidis for his constant support and forever willingness to
patiently edit her writing.
1. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 417 (7th ed. 2017)
(citing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1st ed. 1941)).
2. U.S. Department of the Interior Indian Affairs, Tribal Leaders Directory, INDIAN AFFAIRS,
https://perma.cc/8ZM4-UYKG (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
3. U.S. Department of the Interior Indian Affairs, Frequently Asked Questions, INDIAN AFFAIRS,
https://perma.cc/X8GA-69GV (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
4. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2019).
5. 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1641 (2021).
6. Throughout this article the author uses “Indian” as a legal term of art to refer to Native Americans, Indigenous peoples, and other tribal members who have lived on the North American continent
since time immemorial. The author uses the term Indian when referencing legal concepts to keep consistent with the field of Federal Indian Law.
7. 141 S. Ct. at 1641.
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surrendered it.8 The Court instead based its decision on an exception from
Montana v. United States.9
By grounding its recognition of the tribal authority to detain and investigate in an “exception” to the limitations on tribal civil authority, the Court
continued past the question of whether Congress ever expressly limited sovereignty in regards to this particular power and instead searched through
precedent for justification of the tribal authority to detain and investigate
non-Indians.10 Consequently, the Court implicitly contradicted the “bedrock
principle” of Federal Indian Law that powers of inherent sovereignty are
limited, not granted, by Congress.11 Despite its convoluted analysis and potential for misuse, Cooley is now Federal Indian Law precedent, and it may
still be used in the future to positively support tribal interests.
Section II briefly addresses the history of tribal sovereignty as it applies to jurisdiction in Indian country, including references to police authority over non-Indians and the Montana Exceptions. Section III provides a
factual and procedural background of Cooley. Section IV analyzes the Cooley decision, particularly the Court’s use of the Second Montana Exception,
and how this precedent could impact Federal Indian Law. Section V concludes by encouraging practitioners to bring more claims using the Second
Montana Exception as a method to rectify the Court’s previous limitations
on jurisdiction.
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

AND

JURISDICTION

IN

INDIAN COUNTRY

The extent to which the United States willingly recognizes tribal sovereignty harkens back to a European concept: the Doctrine of Discovery.12
Through the Doctrine of Discovery, Christian Western Europeans granted
themselves the justification—spiritually, politically, and legally—to colonize non-Christians and otherwise inhabit territories via conquest.13 Western Europeans assumed themselves racially and culturally superior to Indig8. Id. at 1643, 1646; CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 416.
9. 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643–45.
10. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643 (Compare “[h]ere, no treaty or statute has explicitly divested Indian
tribes of the policing authority at issue,” with “[w]e turn to precedent to determine whether a tribe has
retained inherent sovereign authority to exercise that power.”); Montana, 450 U.S. at 555–56 (generally,
principles of tribal sovereignty do not extend to “nonmembers” of tribes; however, some civil jurisdiction can be exercised in the event of two exceptions—the “Montana Exceptions,” further discussed infra
Section II.B.2).
11. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 417; David H. Getches,
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 1573, 1654 (1996) (“Bedrock principles of Indian law” left the governance of Indian country to
tribal authority unless Congress expressly divests said authority).
12. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 48.
13. Doctrine of Discovery, UPSTANDER PROJECT, https://perma.cc/3GZK-M93N (last visited Feb.
21, 2022).
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enous peoples; accordingly, Western Europeans felt justified in establishing
colonies on “discovered” land that had been occupied by Indigenous peoples since time immemorial.14 Great Britain invoked this concept to validate
its claim to land in North America.15 Though the Doctrine of Discovery
allowed for the assumption of land, the conundrum for colonizers trying to
invoke their rights to conquest was that to acquire lands “legally” they
needed to first acknowledge land rights. This also required the acknowledgment of the sovereignty and rights of the Indigenous people occupying the
land.16
The acknowledgment of tribal sovereignty and the rights of Indigenous
peoples premises much of the Federal-Tribal relationship, trust responsibility, and the political standing of tribes in the United States.17 In Johnson v.
M’Intosh,18 the Supreme Court of the United States embraced the Discovery Doctrine and held only the United States has the right to extinguish or
convey tribal authority to possess land.19 In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,20
the Court noted that tribes are “more correctly . . . denominated domestic
dependent nations.”21 This status created a relationship between the federal
government and tribes similar to a “ward to his guardian.”22 Shortly after,
in Worcester v. Georgia,23 the Court determined that, because tribes are
“sovereign nations, authorized to govern themselves,” only the federal government may regulate and control tribes.24 These cases together birthed the
concept of the Federal-Tribal relationship, under which the United States
has a “trust responsibility” to respect tribal sovereignty and protect tribal

14. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 48, 62; Monte Mills, Why
Indian Country? An Introduction to the Indian Law Landscape, in INDIAN LAW AND NATURAL RESOURCES: THE BASICS AND BEYOND 1, 14 n.118 (2017) (The concepts of tribal sovereignty have existed
since “time immemorial.” The Court previously used this phrase to acknowledge tribes as the “undisputed possessors of the soil.” Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1833)).
15. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 62.
16. Id. at 61, 64–66 (internal citations omitted); see generally id. at 55–72 (internal citations omitted) (comparing the rights of Indigenous people as recognized by Spain, England, and the English Colonies).
17. Id. at 281, 338; see Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014) (tribal
sovereignty remains subject to Congress’s plenary power).
18. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
19. Id. at 593–605 (because the United States has “discoverer” rights, only land conveyed from
Indigenous peoples to the federal government creates valid titles).
20. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
21. Id. at 13.
22. Id.
23. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
24. Id. at 530–31.
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interests.25 This relationship created federal obligations, that remain enforceable, to tribes in exchange for the vast surrender of their lands.26
A. Tribal Sovereignty as a Retained Right
“Indian tribes retain inherent sovereignty that has not been extinguished by the United States or negotiated away by tribes in treaties and
other agreements.”27 Inherent sovereignty can be limited by Congress, but
powers of inherent sovereignty are not authorities granted by Congress.28
Any decision to limit tribal self-governance is for Congress to decide by
virtue of its plenary power.29
In United States v. Wheeler,30 the Court reaffirmed that tribal authority
is “in general, ‘inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never
been extinguished.’”31 Tribal sovereignty continues until Congress explicitly determines otherwise or by “implication as a necessary result of
[tribes’] dependent status.”32 In return for the protection of the United
States, the tribes “necessarily divested . . . some aspects” of their sovereignty.33 In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation,34 the Court defined “necessary” surrenders of tribal sovereignty to
mean applications of tribal sovereignty that would conflict with “overriding
interests of the National Government.”35 The Court then provided a short
list of these implied surrenders including a prohibition on tribal foreign relations with countries other than the United States, tribal sale or grant of
land rights to non-Indians without the consent of the federal government, or
tribal prosecution of non-Indians without the full protections of the Bill of
Rights.36
25. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation: Its Importance and Potential
Future Ramifications, 59 FED. LAW. 4, 4–5 (2012); Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear & Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
“We Need Protection from Our Protectors”: The Nature, Issues, and Future of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 6 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 397, 401–08 (2017).
26. Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 403.
27. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 415.
28. Id. at 416.
29. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
30. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
31. Id. at 322 (citing FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1st ed. 1945)) (emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 323.
33. Id.
34. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
35. Id. at 153–54.
36. Id.
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B. Jurisdiction in Indian Country
Fundamental to the concept of sovereignty is the ability to assert jurisdiction.37 Accordingly, subject to federal limitation, tribes have authority
over their own lands, people residing on those lands, and people doing business on those lands.38 Save for certain exceptions, tribal jurisdiction does
not extend over non-Indians.39 Congress does not limit criminal or civil
authority over tribal members or criminal authority over nonmember Indians within reservation boundaries.40 Additionally, tribes possess some degree of civil regulatory and adjudicatory authority over anyone who enters
the reservation.41 Because Congress has yet to limit these aspects of sovereignty, until tribes voluntarily relinquish these authorities or Congress abrogates them, they are, presumptively, retained by tribes.42
1. Basics of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction and Tribal Police Power
Originally, tribes had exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed
between tribal members in Indian country.43 Indian country, as defined in
18 U.S.C. § 1151, applies to all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation and Indian allotments, including rights-of-way.44 However, federal
statutes have marred the relative simplicity of this initial approach.45 Most
simplistically, tribes continue to retain the right of criminal jurisdiction over
Indians and nonmember Indians for any crime committed within Indian
country.46 The legal term “Indian” is a political and racial classification.47
For the purpose of criminal jurisdiction, an Indian must be both enrolled in
a federally recognized tribe and “possess Indian blood.”48 The federal circuits interpret differently what exactly qualifies a person as Indian; conse37. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 509.
38. Id.
39. See generally Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211–12 (1978).
40. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 416.
41. Id.
42. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323–24 (1978).
43. CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 574.
44. Id. at 510.
45. Id. at 531–32 (most significant: the Indian Country Crimes Act created federal jurisdiction for
specific offenses committed by Indians against non-Indians; the Major Crimes Act grants federal authority to prosecute certain felonies by Indians in Indian country; and the Assimilative Crimes Act allows
federal jurisdiction over violations of state law).
46. There are specific exceptions to this under 25 U.S.C. § 1304—tribes in compliance with § 1304
have limited jurisdiction over crimes of domestic violence over “all persons” when the victim is an
Indian.
47. Adam Crepelle, Tribal Courts, The Violence Against Women Act, and Supplemental Jurisdiction: Expanding Tribal Court Jurisdiction to Improve Public Safety in Indian Country, 81 MONT. L.
REV. 59, 69 (2020).
48. Id.
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quently, Indian status is an incredibly controversial subject.49 But most important to the basics of criminal jurisdiction, as held in Oliphant v. Suquamish,50 tribes were divested of the right to criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians.51 This limitation on tribal sovereignty was determined to be one
“implicitly” surrendered by virtue of tribes’ statuses as domestic dependent
nations and also a power expressly limited by Congress.52 Though Congress
limited the authority of tribes to assert criminal jurisdiction in the form of
prosecuting non-Indians, Congress never explicitly removed the right of tribal police to detain or conduct a limited investigation of a criminal suspect—regardless of final jurisdiction.53
When considering limitations on criminal jurisdiction, the Court has
emphasized interests of non-Indians over typical aspects of sovereignty.54
In Duro v. Reina,55 the Court held that, pursuant to its fear that people
might be subject to laws and “trial by political bodies that do not include
them,” tribes also did not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers—
regardless of Indian status.56 After Duro, Congress amended the Indian
Civil Rights Act to recognize the inherent power of tribes to assert criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians—regardless of tribal status.57 In United States
v. Lara,58 the Court upheld this amendment, thus superseding its holding in
Duro.59 In Lara, the Court considered whether Congress possessed the authority to relax limitations previously imposed on inherent sovereignty.60 It
held that Congress could, within its plenary power, both limit tribal authority and relax that limitation.61 The Court rejected the notion that Congress
49. Id. at 69–70.
50. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
51. Id. at 211–12.
52. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695–96 (1990). Justice Brennan dissented to write the Court’s
reading of Oliphant applied the consequences of tribal dependent status too broadly. Justice Brennan
noted the “contradictory policies” of the United States with respect to tribes and tribal members; nevertheless, he argued that Congress needed to promote the independence and self-governance of tribes. He
argued the majority’s opinion in Duro directly conflicted with Congress’s intent to respect tribal jurisdiction. Id. at 698–99, 709–10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1643–46 (2021) (Cooley reviews Congressional statutory schemes and precedent to determine this conclusion).
54. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196–97, 205 (the Court overturned the Court of Appeals’ recognition
of tribal sovereignty as a reason to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and dismissed the issue
of tribal protection).
55. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
56. Id. at 693, 695–96.
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
58. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
59. Id. at 210 (upholding 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
60. Id. at 196.
61. Id. at 202–03.
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“delegates” federal authority to tribes as a basis of jurisdiction; rather, tribes
derive jurisdictional authority from their inherent tribal sovereignty.62
Tribal police authorities differ from tribal criminal jurisdiction. Tribes
retain a “traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons whom they
deem to be undesirable from tribal lands.”63 This inherent power supports
the authority of tribal police to restrain and eject persons that “disturb public order.”64 Though the right to exclude bolsters the tribal authority to detain and investigate, regulatory authority arises from inherent sovereign
powers independent from the power to exclude.65 Therefore, the authority
of tribes to detain and investigate ceases only when Congress expressly
limits that authority, not when Congress limits the right to exclude.66
Where tribal criminal jurisdiction has been limited, tribal officers may
still detain a non-Indian and transport them to the appropriate jurisdiction.67
Without the authority to also investigate potential violations by conducting
limited searches, the tribal authority to detain carries little weight.68 Accordingly, Congress never intended to abrogate the tribal authority to conduct these limited searches.69 Congress has not divested tribes of the authority to temporarily detain and search non-Indians, nor have tribes implicitly given up this authority as a “necessary” part of recognition as domestic
dependent nations.70
2. Basics of Tribal Civil Jurisdiction and the Montana Exceptions
Limitations on tribal civil jurisdiction are justified by nonmembers and
non-Indians having “no say in the laws and regulations governing tribal
territory.”71 Generally, tribes retain jurisdiction over the adjudication of
civil disputes where one party is a tribal member and the dispute occurs on
Indian-owned land.72 However, some behavior from nonmembers will subject them to tribal authority.73
62. Id. at 198–99.
63. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696 (1990).
64. Id. at 697.
65. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 425 (1989);
United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1644 (2021).
66. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323–24 (1978) (until specifically divested by
Congress, tribes retain aspects of inherent sovereignty).
67. Duro, 495 U.S. at 697.
68. United States v. Ortiz-Berraza, 512 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1975) (the power to exclude
would be “meaningless” without the power to also investigate violations).
69. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643, 1645–46; see Ortiz-Berraza, 512 F.2d at 1180.
70. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643, 1646.
71. Plains Com. Bank v. Long Fam. Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008).
72. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
219–23 (1959).
73. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66.
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Not all land within Indian country is owned by Indians. The Dawes
Act of 1887 authorized the United States to divide tribal landholdings into
allotments.74 The United States, through this new division of land, attempted to force tribes into more Westernized ideals of land ownership and
use.75 The Dawes Act resulted in much of the land set aside for reservation
territories being appropriated by the United States, which then turned
around and sold it to non-Indians.76 The patchwork of land ownership
within Indian country makes civil jurisdiction a tedious analysis.
In Montana, the Court held that tribes do not have authority over disputes that occur on lands within reservation boundaries owned by nonmembers—Indian or non-Indian.77 However, the Court identified two scenarios
where tribal civil jurisdiction has not been limited: the Montana Exceptions.78 The First Montana Exception to the limit on tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indian owned land is when nonmembers enter into “consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”79 The Second Montana Exception applies when a nonmember’s “conduct threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.”80 Though Montana originally dealt with regulatory jurisdiction over
nonmembers, Strate v. A-1 Contractors81 applied the Montana Exceptions
to civil adjudicatory matters over nonmembers on public rights-of-way
within Indian country and, in doing so, demonstrated the narrowness of the
Montana Exceptions.82
In Strate, a truck owned by A-1 Contractors struck Gisela Fredericks’s
car on a state highway that ran through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.83 Fredericks spent 24 days in the hospital due to injuries sustained
during the collision.84 Fredericks then filed a personal injury claim against
A-1 Contractors in the Tribal Court for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation.85 The collision occurred on a highway main74. 25 U.S.C. § 331, repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-462, Title I, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 2007.
75. The Dawes Act, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, https://perma.cc/WNS6-HPL7 (last visited Feb. 23,
2022).
76. Id.
77. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–66.
78. Id. at 565–66; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Ethical Implications of the Montana Rule and Exceptions, TURTLE TALK, Mar. 25, 2011, https://perma.cc/ZXZ3-667G.
79. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
80. Id. at 566.
81. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
82. Id. at 442, 459.
83. Id. at 442–43.
84. Id. at 443.
85. Id. at 443–44.
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tained by North Dakota as a granted right-of-way from the United States;
this proved important to the Court’s jurisdictional analysis.86 The Tribe
owned the business that subcontracted A-1 Contractors, but A-1 Contractors itself was not Indian-owned, and it operated its principal place of business outside the boundaries of Fort Berthold.87 Additionally, though her late
husband and children were all Tribal members, Fredericks was not a member of the Tribe.88 A-1 Contractors appealed the validity of tribal jurisdiction because A-1 Contractors was not an Indian-owned business, Fredericks
was not a member of the Tribe, and the collision did not occur on Indianowned land.89 The Court found that one of the two Montana Exceptions
must apply for tribal civil jurisdiction to extend when the incident occurs on
a public right-of-way.90 It held neither Montana Exception fit this situation.91 As for the First Montana Exception, the Court held that the dispute
between Fredericks and A-1 Contractors was “distinctly non-tribal in nature.”92 Because Fredericks was a nonmember and A-1 Contractors was a
nonmember-owned business, the Tribe was not involved.93 Undoubtedly, as
subcontractors, A-1 Contractors entered a consensual relationship with the
Tribe.94 However, the Court determined this consensual relationship did not
involve Fredericks.95 The First Montana Exception did not apply because
the incident occurred on non-Indian-owned land and the accident involved
another nonmember.96 The Court determined the Second Montana Exception also did not apply.97 The Second Montana Exception applies when the
conduct of nonmembers threatens tribes or directly affects the health and
welfare of the tribes.98 The Court deemed the “proper application” of the
Second Montana Exception is to situations that support tribal rights to protect self-governance or to control internal relations.99 It held tribal jurisdiction over a vehicle accident on a public right-of-way between two nonmembers did not support the furtherance of these tribal rights.100
86. Id. at 442–43.
87. Id. at 443.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 443–44.
90. Id. at 455–56.
91. Id. at 459.
92. Id. at 457 (citing A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 520 U.S.
438 (1997)).
93. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 457–58.
97. Id. at 458–59.
98. Id. at 457.
99. Id. at 459.
100. Id.
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The Court in Strate determined that assertion of civil jurisdiction on
non-Indian owned land implicates a Montana Exception analysis when defendants are nonmembers and, in doing so, the Court demonstrated that the
Montana Exceptions are fairly narrow.101 Notably, the decision in Strate
did not call into question tribal police authority to patrol public highways
within the reservation.102 Footnote 11 in Strate clearly states that the
Court’s decision did not address the rights of tribal police authorities.103
III. COOLEY:

FROM THE

CROW RESERVATION

TO THE

SUPREME COURT

A. Factual Background
On February 26, 2016, within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Reservation, Tribal Highway Safety Officer James Saylor noticed a pickup
truck pulled off on the shoulder of State Highway 212 with its engine running.104 It was 1:00 a.m., and Officer Saylor knew that this area had poor
cellphone reception.105 Concerned that the occupants of the truck might
need help, Officer Saylor pulled behind it and activated his rear emergency
lights.106 When Officer Saylor approached the truck and knocked to alert
occupants of his presence, the rear driver’s side window started to roll down
but then rolled back up.107 Through the window, Officer Saylor could see a
small child crawling around in the back.108 Officer Saylor moved to the
front driver’s side window and observed Joshua Cooley in the driver’s seat,
now with the roaming child sitting on his lap.109 Officer Saylor initially
observed that Cooley appeared to be non-Indian and “had bloodshot, watery
eyes” but did not smell of alcohol.110
Cooley told Officer Saylor he pulled over due to fatigue but that “everything was fine.”111 Officer Saylor then inquired about Cooley’s business
on that particular stretch of highway and why he was out on the road at 1:00
a.m.112 Cooley told Officer Saylor he purchased a vehicle in Lame Deer but
the vehicle broke down, and someone—either Thomas Spang or Thomas
101. Id. at 450–52, 459.
102. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 651 (2001).
103. Strate, 520 U.S. at 455–56 n.11.
104. United States v. Cooley, No. CR 16-42-BLG-SPW, 2017 WL 499896, at *1 (D. Mont. Feb. 7,
2017), aff’d, 919 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Shoulderblade—loaned him the truck he was driving.113 Officer Saylor suspected that Cooley lied to him about his whereabouts and asked Cooley to
lower his window; he then noticed two semiautomatic rifles next to Cooley
in the front passenger seat.114 Cooley claimed the rifles belonged to whomever lent him the truck.115 At this point, Officer Saylor requested identification.116 Cooley first pulled out several “wad[s] of cash” from his pants
pocket.117 Cooley reached into his pockets again but hesitated and appeared
on edge.118 Due to this behavior, Officer Saylor told Cooley to stop and
show his hands.119 Officer Saylor again asked Cooley for identification but
told him to retrieve it slowly.120 Cooley gave Officer Saylor a Wyoming
driver’s license.121 At this time, Officer Saylor could not run Cooley’s identification because the poor reception on his portable unit prevented him
from radioing dispatch.122 Officer Saylor then opened the passenger door of
the truck and observed a pistol under the center console.123 Officer Saylor
ordered Cooley out of the truck and patted him down; after he found nothing, he told Cooley to wait in the back of his patrol unit.124
After securing both Cooley and the small child in the back of his patrol
unit, Officer Saylor radioed dispatch to send a county unit to assist because
Cooley appeared to be non-Indian.125 Officer Saylor returned to the truck to
turn off the engine and noticed drug paraphernalia and what appeared to be
white powder.126 Soon after, Officer Saylor was joined by Lieutenant
Sharon Brown of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Deputy Gibbs of Big
Horn County—Lieutenant Brown ordered Officer Saylor “to seize all contraband in the truck within plain view.”127
Cooley was charged in federal court with Possession of
Methamphetamine with Intent to Distribute and Possession of a Firearm in
Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime.128 Cooley moved to suppress evi113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1.
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dence discovered by Officer Saylor under the Indian Civil Rights Act and
the Fourth Amendment.129
B. Procedural History
1. The District Court’s Decision
The United States District Court for the District of Montana, Billings
Division, suppressed evidence that arose from Officer Saylor’s seizure of
Cooley and subsequent search of the truck.130 The district court held that
tribal police do not retain the authority to investigate all potential violations
of state and federal law within the boundaries of a reservation.131 It determined that a tribal officer can stop any person they suspect as violators of
tribal law within reservation boundaries, but they can only detain non-Indian suspects for “obvious” violations of state or federal law for the time it
takes to turn them over to the relevant authority.132 The district court found
that Officer Saylor immediately knew Cooley was non-Indian “when [he]
initially rolled his window down”—despite not yet receiving any identification.133 The district court found no “apparent” violation of state or federal
law that would allow Officer Saylor to seize Cooley, a non-Indian.134 The
district court used Bressi v. Ford135 to determine that the scope of police
authority to detain and investigate does not extend to non-Indians on state
highways.136 According to the district court, “the power to exclude” does
not extend to state highways within reservation boundaries.137 It used footnote 11 from Strate to support this assertion.138 Therefore, it suppressed
evidence obtained from the seizure of Cooley by Officer Saylor.139
The government appealed the district court’s grant of Cooley’s motion
to suppress.140 The Ninth Circuit considered the district court’s determination of limited police authority as it applied to Cooley’s seizure and subsequent search.141
129. Id.
130. Id. at *3, 5.
131. Id. at *3.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *4.
134. Id. at *3–4.
135. 575 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2009).
136. Cooley, 2017 WL 499896 at *3.
137. Id.
138. Id. (referencing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 455–56 n.11 (1997)).
139. Id. at *5.
140. United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated and remanded, United
States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021).
141. Id. at 1141, 1145.
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2. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the tribal right to exclude to affirm
the district court.142 Like the district court, it determined that tribal civil
jurisdiction of the kind considered in Strate applied analogously to tribal
police authorities.143 Further, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court’s broad use of Bressi to prohibit the investigation of non-Indians using public rights-of-way.144 It narrowed the appropriate detention of a nonIndian by tribal police to encompass a single question: “whether the suspect
is an Indian.”145 During this limited interaction, if the tribal officer witnesses an “apparent” violation of state or federal law, they may continue to
detain a non-Indian suspect.146
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s finding that Officer Saylor sufficiently determined Cooley’s Indian status through a
cracked window.147 It nonetheless confirmed that Officer Saylor overstepped his tribal police authority because he “reached a conclusion” about
Cooley’s Indian status based on his appearance rather than asking Cooley.148 It also concluded that a tribal officer could rely on a person’s response about their Indian status for the purpose of deciding whether to continue or cease an investigation.149
The Ninth Circuit further held that, regardless of how Officer Saylor
determined Indian status, he exceeded tribal police authority by seizing,
continuing to detain, and searching Cooley without confirming his Indian
status.150 It affirmed the district court’s exclusion of evidence obtained by
virtue of Officer Saylor’s seizure and search of Cooley and his truck.151 The
government petitioned for a panel rehearing and a rehearing en banc but
was denied.152 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on
November 20, 2020.153

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
30022).
153.

Id. at 1141, 1147.
Id. at 1141–42.
Id.
Id. at 1142.
Id. (citing Bressi v. Ford, 575 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Id. at 1143.
Id.
Id. at 1148.
Order Denying Petition, United States v. Cooley, 947 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 17Order Granting Certiorari, United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 19-1414).
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3. The United States’s Argument to the Supreme Court
Petitioner, the United States, argued the lower court improperly diminished tribal authority, impeded state and federal law enforcement, and
threatened the safety of Indian reservations—particularly the safety of officers and tribal members.154 The United States reasoned that tribes never
gave up and were never deprived of their “inherent sovereign authority to
reasonably investigate and temporarily detain people within their borders
for violations of other sovereigns’ laws.”155
The United States likened tribes to other sovereigns with the power to
protect their community within their borders.156 It used the example of
States’ inherent authority to detain and investigate suspected violators of
federal law.157 It emphasized the inherent authority of tribes as independent
sovereigns, and it noted that the authority to temporarily detain and investigate within reservation boundaries was never “withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a result of their dependent status.”158 To hold that
tribes do not retain this necessary detention and investigation authority
would too severely hinder tribal officers’ response to criminal activity and
their ability to protect themselves and others.159 The United States argued
that precedent supported its position—even as applied to public rights-ofway running through reservations.160 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s decision not only arose from a flawed legal concept to create an “unprecedented
framework,” it also did not make practical sense.161 The Ninth Circuit
would have tribal police only stop people suspected of violating tribal law,
and even then, only suspects of known Indian status unless tribal police
witnessed an “apparent” violation of state or federal law.162 The United
States suggested this framework would encourage deception from suspects
regarding their Indian or non-Indian status and also eliminate the ability to
investigate under otherwise justified Fourth Amendment standards.163

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Brief for Petitioner at 13, United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 19-1414).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15–16.
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4. Cooley’s Argument to the Supreme Court
Respondent, Cooley, argued that retained sovereign authority did not
include tribal police authority over non-Indians on public rights-of-way.164
Therefore, Officer Saylor’s detention and investigation of Cooley exceeded
tribal jurisdiction.165 Cooley submitted a criminal jurisdiction analysis pertinent to the limits on tribal authority to prosecute non-Indians and argued
that this analysis also applied to the tribal authority to detain and investigate
potential criminal activity.166 Cooley contended that, similar to
prosecutorial jurisdiction, tribes surrendered the authority to detain and investigate by becoming domestic dependent nations.167
Cooley further argued against the United States’s policy concerns—
jurisdictional gaps or voids should not be filled with tribal authority by
default.168 Instead, Cooley urged the Court to consider Congressional authority to limit tribal jurisdiction.169 Cooley then argued that Congress filled
jurisdictional voids through cross-deputization statutes in opposition to the
United States’s assertion that Congress never expressly abrogated the tribal
police power to detain and investigate and that cross-deputization of tribal
officers was impeded by the Ninth Circuit’s framework.170
Cooley attacked the United States’s assertion of “undisputed” sovereignty to detain and investigate suspected violators of other sovereigns’
laws by referencing the “unique and limited” sovereignty of tribes.171 Cooley asserted tribes generally do not retain authority over non-Indians, and
this is particularly true on non-Indian land.172 Cooley then accused the
United States of using a rejected analysis to “create” retained inherent sovereignty where there was none.173 Finally, Cooley argued Strate did not
“establish an inherent tribal police power over non-Indians on a public
right-of-way” because tribal police power should not exceed civil regulatory and adjudicatory authority.174

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Brief for Respondent at 10, United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 19-1414).
Id.
Id. at 10–11.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 14, 17.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 13, 22–23.
Id. at 22.
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5. Reference to the Montana Exceptions in the Briefs
Though fundamental to the Supreme Court’s decision, neither the
United States nor Cooley relied significantly on the Montana Exceptions or
the implications of these Exceptions on the issue of retained tribal police
authorities.175
The United States cited Montana to demonstrate that, if police authority were the same as civil regulatory and adjudicatory authority, the Second
Montana Exception could apply because tribal police need to protect the
public from threats and aid state and federal law enforcement through investigating suspected violations of law—e.g., driving under the influence or
transporting contraband through the reservation.176
Cooley took issue with the United States’s separation of tribal police
power from general concepts of jurisdiction; Cooley argued that police
power “cannot exceed [tribal] regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction.”177
If civil regulatory and adjudicatory authority applied to police power, then
the Second Montana Exception could not apply because this situation did
not affront “political integrity.”178 It argued that a vehicle pulled off of a
public right-of-way was not “catastrophic” to tribal self-governance.179
A number of amici curiae briefs were submitted to the Court.180 Not
one encouraged the Court to apply the Montana Exceptions or to use this
case as an opportunity to determine the reach of the Second Montana Exception.181
175. See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 154, at 25–26; Brief for Respondent, supra note
164, at 24–25.
176. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 154, at 25–26.
177. Brief for Respondent, supra note 164, at 20.
178. Id. at 24–25.
179. Id. at 25.
180. Tribal Supreme Court Project, United States v. Cooley (19-1414), NARF, https://perma.cc/
4EDZ-8KHW (last visited Feb. 26, 2022).
181. See Brief Amici Curiae of Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation in Support of
Petitioner, United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 19-1414); Brief of the Lower Brule
Sioux Tribe, et al., United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 19-1414); Brief of Amici
Curiae National Indigenous Women’s Resource Center, et al., United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638
(2021) (No. 19-1414); Brief Amici Curiae of the National Congress of American Indians, Tribal Nations
and Inter-Tribal Organizations, United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 19-1414); Brief
Amici Curiae of Former United States Attorneys, United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No.
19-1414); Brief for the Cayuga Nation, et al., United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 191414); Brief of Current and Former Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 19-1414); Brief for Indian Law and Policy Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 191414); Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Respondent, United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 19-1414); Brief Amici Curiae of the
Ninth Circuit Federal Public and Community Defenders, United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021)
(No. 19-1414); Brief for Citizens Equal Rights Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638 (2021) (No. 19-1414).
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6. The United States Supreme Court’s Decision
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.182 Only
Justice Alito filed a concurrence.183 The Court found no evidence that Congress ever limited the authority of tribes to temporarily detain and investigate non-Indians within reservation boundaries; rather, the current legislative and executive understanding of tribal sovereignty is that tribes “retained this authority.”184 It also determined this inherent authority “rests
upon a tribe’s retention of sovereignty as interpreted by Montana, and in
particular its second exception.”185 Notably, this was the first time the
Court ever found tribal interests strong enough to extend authority over
non-Indians using the Second Montana Exception.186
Though the Court noted “no treaty or statute has explicitly divested
Indian tribes of the policing authority at issue,” it considered the use of the
Second Montana Exception “highly relevant” to its analysis.187 The Court
proceeded to a concise summary of retained aspects of tribal sovereignty as
interpreted under the Federal-Tribal relationship from its considerations of
sovereign authority in Worcester to the lack of criminal jurisdiction in Oliphant and the overarching plenary power of Congress.188 It culminated this
summary by clearly stating that tribes were not explicitly divested of the
right to police non-Indians to the extent at issue.189 The Court then turned to
the Montana Exceptions to seek justification for its affirmation of the authority to police non-Indians.190
The Court found that the Second Montana Exception concerning the
health and safety of tribes fit this issue “almost like a glove.”191 It held that
denying tribal police the authority to conduct a limited detention and search
of a person they suspect to have committed some sort of criminal activity
would create an impractical difficulty for tribes to protect themselves and
their members.192 The Court then examined its precedent and found it recognized “a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority to engage in policing of the
kind before [it].”193 It noted Strate did not call to question the authority to
182. United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1640, 1646 (2021).
183. Id. (Alito, J., concurring) (Justice Alito noted that he understands that the opinion “holds no
more” than recognition of police authority in this very specific instance).
184. Id. at 1646.
185. Id.
186. Elizabeth Reese, Affirmation of Inherent Tribal Power to Police Blurs Civil and Criminal Indian Law Tests, SCOTUSBLOG, June 7, 2021 at 10:29 PM, https://perma.cc/N6X4-MSDN.
187. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643.
188. Id. at 1642–43.
189. Id. at 1643.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1643–44.
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police at issue.194 It also noted this authority was supported by Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley.195 It recognized tribes have always had the power to
detain a person and transfer them to authorities with appropriate criminal
jurisdiction.196 And it pointed out the “authority to search a non-Indian
prior to transport [was] ancillary to this authority that we have already recognized.”197 The Court expressed concern over the Ninth Circuit’s proposed framework to require “apparent” violations to allow the temporary
detention of non-Indians.198 It feared this might encourage suspects to lie
about Indian status and that “apparent” violations created a new standard of
search and seizure law.199 The Court addressed Cooley’s contention that
Congress did limit tribal police authority via cross-deputization statutes that
grant tribes the authority to enforce federal laws.200 And the Court found
“nothing in these provisions that shows that Congress sought to deny tribes
the authority at issue . . . .”201
The Court rested its analysis upon inherent tribal sovereignty “as interpreted by Montana, and in particular its second exception.”202 It found the
Second Montana Exception, grounded in concepts of civil authority over
non-Indians, governed the issue of tribal police powers.203 And the Court
wove the Second Montana Exception throughout its opinion, tying it into
concepts of criminal jurisdiction and retained rights as the “interpretation”
of tribal retention of sovereignty.204
Because the Court found nothing to divest tribes of the retained right
to the policing authority at issue, and because it determined the Second
Montana Exception applied, it vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and
remanded the case to the district court.205
IV.

ANALYSIS

Foundational to Federal Indian Law is the concept that, by virtue of the
trust responsibility the United States owes to tribes, rights of inherent tribal
sovereignty are retained unless expressly divested by Congress or surren194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1644 (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456–59 (1997)).
(citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 651 (2001)).

at 1645.

at 1646.
at 1641.
at 1643–46.
at 1646.
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dered by tribes.206 Historically, the Court has not done the best job recognizing this fundamental concept.207 In Cooley, the Court again demonstrated its hesitance to examine only limitations on tribal sovereignty and
instead sought affirmative justification of retained tribal authority by rooting the Cooley decision in the Second Montana Exception.208 The Court
found that no statute divested tribes of the right to temporarily detain and
investigate, nor did tribes give up this right implicitly as a result of becoming domestic dependent nations.209 But rather than end its analysis there,
and make a relatively short opinion even shorter, the Court proceeded to an
examination of Montana.210 Though the Court did find, for the first time, a
tribal interest strong enough to justify application of the Second Montana
Exception, this analysis was unnecessary and, further, may have had the
unintended effect of weakening fundamental concepts of inherent tribal
sovereignty.211 Whether the Court’s analysis will prove beneficial to tribal
interests in the future of Federal Indian Law is yet to be determined, but this
opinion could be used to go one of two ways: (1) it could further the
Court’s continued convolution of Federal Indian Law principles and be
weaponized to undermine tribal authority; or (2) it could be used to recognize more tribal interests.212
A. The Montana Exceptions: As Applied to What Federal Indian Law Is
Supposed to Be
The Court’s analysis not only conflates criminal and civil jurisdictional
tests, it also conflates the relevant inquiry; rather than search for an express
limitation on tribal sovereignty, the Court swivels its analysis to a search for
justifications of tribal sovereignty.213 This is not the first time the Court has
poked and prodded Federal Indian Law frameworks to better fit its narrative.214 It is also not the first time that the Court has demonstrated a poten206. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INLAW, supra note 1, at 417.
207. Getches, supra note 11, at 1573–74.
208. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1641.
209. Id. at 1643, 1646 (to the contrary, it found statutory evidence that Congress considered this
right reserved).
210. Id. at 1641, 1643.
211. Reese, supra note 186; see Getches, supra note 11, at 1573 (the Court’s “subjectivist” approach
to Indian jurisdiction contradicts tribal sovereignty).
212. See generally Getches, supra note 11 (referencing the Court’s subjective approach to Indian
Law). Contra Reese, supra note 186 (suggesting that the Court’s use of Montana might reflect a newfound willingness to consider tribal public safety implications).
213. See Getches, supra note 11, at 1573–74 (analyzing outside the fundamental concepts of Federal
Indian Law demonstrates the Court’s “subjectivism” and willingness to fit the law to non-Indian interests).
214. Id.
DIAN
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tial misunderstanding of Federal Indian Law.215 The late David Getches, a
prominent advocate for Native American rights, theorized in his influential
1996 law review article, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, that the Court has mishandled Federal Indian Law principles to the extent lower courts are left “without principled, comprehensible guidance.”216 Getches accused the Court of
departing from traditional Federal Indian Law principles—specifically the
need to respect sovereignty “unless and until Congress clearly states a contrary intention.”217 Getches considered the “Modern Era” of Federal Indian
Law a time when the use of traditional principles supported the political
influence and security of tribes.218 He noted this era ended when the Court
“assum[ed] a prerogative” left to Congress and started to review non-Indian
interests in decisions that “cast a cultural shadow” on tribal sovereignty.219
As the Court became “susceptible” to arguments in favor of non-Indians,
the Court started to demonstrate a “subjectivist approach” to Federal Indian
Law decisions rather than an adherence to traditional principles of sovereignty.220 Getches hoped the Court might course correct its subjective approach and return to fundamental principles of Federal Indian Law, but the
decision in Cooley suggests the Court will not return to these fundamental
principles in the near future.221
The Court could have sufficiently concluded tribes retain the power to
temporarily detain and investigate non-Indians based on the absence of
Congressional limitation and based on its own precedent that determined
215. Id. at 1574–76; see David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of
States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 267 (2001) (“The
Rehnquist Court seems oblivious to the discrete body of Indian law.”); Carole Goldberg, Finding the
Way to Indian Country: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Decisions in Indian Law Cases, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
1003, 1003 (2009) (“Justice Ginsburg . . . revealed little familiarity with fundamental principles of
federal Indian law or with the history and present realities of tribal communities.”); Gloria ValenciaWeber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the
Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 409–10 (2003) (“The cumulative
decisions of the Court do not engender optimism about the future of tribal jurisdiction when the cases
eviscerate . . . the authority of the first sovereigns within the borders of the United States.”); Maggie
Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1836–37
(2019) (“Colonialism, it seems, begets colonialism.”).
216. Getches, supra note 11, at 1573; see A Tribute to David Getches, WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES, https://perma.cc/N5C4-8ASU (last visited Mar. 1, 2022); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Scalia Memorandum to Brennan in Duro v. Reina, TURTLE TALK, Nov. 13, 2012, https://perma.cc/VG7H-QXM5.
217. Getches, supra note 11, at 1573–74.
218. Id. at 1576–77.
219. Id. at 1574–75.
220. Id. at 1575–76.
221. Id. at 1576; see Reese, supra note 186. Reese notes that the Court conflates criminal and civil
jurisdiction tests. This demonstrates the Court’s continued willingness to mold its precedents to fit its
desired outcome. However, this instance differs from Getches’s issues with “subjectivism” because Cooley weighed in favor of tribal interests.
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this right was not one given up as an aspect of dependency.222 In combing
through precedent, under foundational principles of Federal Indian Law, the
Court should have searched for an express limitation rather than a justification for tribal sovereignty.223 The inability to temporarily detain and investigate non-Indians absolutely threatens the health, safety, and welfare of
tribes, but tribes do not need to meet this “exception” to justify the retention
of their inherent rights and powers as sovereigns.
The Court acknowledged “no treaty or statute has explicitly divested
Indian tribes of the policing authority at issue.”224 The Court then examined
its precedent to support this determination.225 Justification for divesting
tribes of jurisdiction over non-Indians comes from a fear that non-Indians
might be subject to laws they have “no say” in creating.226 Disregarding the
flaws in this logic—a topic for another paper—Congress did divest tribes of
criminal prosecutorial authority over non-Indians and does control
prosecutorial authority over Indians.227 Notably, Congress has not limited
tribal police authority.228 Civil jurisdiction differs slightly in that it does
allow for some instances of non-Indians appearing as defendants within tribal courts.229 But again, this civil jurisdiction does not address, let alone
expressly limit, tribal police authority.230
The Court understood that no Congressional act ever divested tribes of
the inherent authority to police by temporarily detaining and searching nonIndians and that tribes have never surrendered this right.231 With these answers, the Court had enough information to end its analysis. Tribes never
gave up this right nor had it taken from them; ergo, tribes retained the right
to temporarily detain and investigate non-Indians.232 The Court took its
analysis an unnecessary step further when it held that “Montana’s second
exception recognizes that inherent authority.”233
222. United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1644 (2021); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
323 (1978).
223. See Getches, supra note 11, at 1573–76.
224. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643.
225. Id. at 1643–45.
226. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990); Plains Com. Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.,
554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008).
227. 18 U.S.C. § 1153; Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191, 203–211 (1978).
228. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1645–46 (noting through an examination of its precedent that this authority was not limited).
229. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
230. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 n.11 (1997); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645, 651–52 (2001) (confirming that the use of the First Montana Exception in Strate “did not
question the ability of tribal police”).
231. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643–46 (no treaty or statute ever divested this right, and police authority
does not implicate past concerns of tribal laws applying to non-Indians).
232. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
233. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1644.
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If the Court wanted to use Montana to reach its conclusion, it could
have taken a different analytical approach. If the Court found tribal police
authority to be an exclusively civil authority, it could then employ the Second Montana Exception.234 But the Court did not determine that police authority is a civil regulation. The use of the Second Montana Exception is
not problematic only because it reflects a questionable understanding of
Federal Indian Law concepts, but because this misunderstanding erodes the
trust responsibility that the United States owes to tribes to protect tribal
interests by respecting inherent tribal sovereignty.235 This responsibility remains an enforceable obligation of the United States government, and the
Court risks diminishing that obligation by deciding cases outside of foundational principles of the trust relationship.236 The trust relationship demands
a respect for tribal sovereignty—accordingly, the Court needs to seek limitations on tribal authority rather than justifications for the existence of tribal
authority. The Court’s analysis should have been limited to two related inquiries: (1) did Congress divest tribes of the right to police this issue; and
(2) was there evidence that the tribes gave up the right at issue? If the
answer to both questions is no, then the analysis ends.
Unquestionably, the right to the police authority at issue affects the
health, safety, and welfare of tribes.237 But because the right in question
was never expressly divested, nor given up as an aspect of becoming domestic dependent nations, the right at issue did not need to affect the health,
safety, or welfare of tribes for the Court to recognize it as a retained power
of inherent tribal sovereignty.238 Embedding this particular tribal power in
an exception to historically civil limitations on tribal authority, rather than
narrowing its analysis to an acknowledgment that Congress never limited
this tribal power, rejects foundations of the trust responsibility—the United
States must respect the inherent sovereignty of tribes.239

234. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (the Montana Exceptions apply to adjudicatory as well as regulatory
civil jurisdiction).
235. The importance in following principles of Federal Indian Law rests partially in the recognition
that the courts as “culturally estranged” decision makers inappropriately subject tribes to what legal
concepts “ought to be,” thus threatening their cultural survival. It is the duty of the federal government
to protect these interests under the trust relationship. Getches, supra note 11, at 1581–85; Rey-Bear &
Fletcher, supra note 25, at 403–06.
236. Getches, supra note 11, at 1573–74; see Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 403–05.
237. See generally Crepelle, supra note 47, at 61–64, 80–86 (public safety concerns under the current patchwork of tribal jurisdiction is a pervasive problem in Indian country).
238. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323–24 (1978).
239. Rey-Bear & Fletcher, supra note 25, at 403.
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B. The Montana Exceptions: As Applied to What Federal Indian Law Is
The reality of Federal Indian Law is that the Court has significant subjective influence over its direction.240 Though an opinion that added nothing new to precedent might have better supported the concept that rights are
retained until expressly divested, the use of Montana in this situation could
reopen doors to jurisdiction previously thought shut tight.
Up to this point, Montana was a strictly civil test.241 And the Second
Montana Exception has not been used successfully to vindicate tribal authority over non-Indians.242 Even in what arguably could be the most obvious example of a health or welfare question, the Court used the First Montana Exception, a consensual relationship, rather than take the opportunity
to validate tribal safety concerns through the Second Montana Exception.243
In Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,244 the Fifth
Circuit used the First Montana Exception to recognize tribal civil jurisdiction over torts brought against nonmembers.245 In Dolgencorp, Inc., the defendant corporation operated a Dollar General store within the boundaries
of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians on land held by the United
States.246 The Tribe entered a lease agreement with the corporation and
issued a business license for the store to operate.247 The store participated in
a “Youth Opportunity Program,” operated by the Tribe, that placed young
Tribal members in unpaid positions with local businesses for “education
purposes.”248 The store manager, after agreeing to participate in this program, sexually abused a thirteen-year-old member of the Tribe assigned to
work with Dollar General as part of the program.249 The Fifth Circuit had to
address a number of complicated concerns regarding the commercial relationship between the Tribe and the corporation, the “nexus” of the event
leading to the tort, past precedent, off-reservation conduct, and the allowance of punitive damages as a result of using the First Montana Exception.250 Arguably, the Second Montana Exception could have reached the
conclusion that the corporation was liable much quicker. No analysis of the
240. See Getches, supra note 11, at 1574–75.
241. Reese, supra note 186.
242. Id.
243. See Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 177 (5th Circ.
2014), aff’d Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 579 U.S. 545 (2016). Notably,
this decision was affirmed by an equally divided Court; the Court did not take this as an opportunity to
impose the second Montana exception as precedent.
244. 746 F.3d 167.
245. Id. at 172–73, 177.
246. Id. at 169.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 173–77.
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consensual relationship with the Tribe would have been necessary if it was
argued and held that this behavior threatened the Tribe’s health and welfare
by implicating the health and welfare of the Tribe’s children. To be fair, the
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians did not rely on the Second Montana
Exception in their response brief to the Supreme Court of the United
States.251 But the dissent in Dolgencorp, Inc. suggested that the First Montana Exception applied only to contract claims while the Second Montana
Exception applied only to tort claims, if it applied at all.252 The Court did
not offer any recommendation to rectify this question in its affirmation;
rather, the equally divided Court affirmed by default, thus leaving the question of the Second Montana Exception’s applicability dangling.253 In affirming Dolgencorp, Inc., the Court chose to not even consider the Second
Montana Exception. Even when the Court has entertained the Second Montana Exception, it has not done so in favor of tribal interests.254
The Court’s use of the Second Montana Exception in Cooley blurred
the use of the Montana Exceptions between civil and criminal jurisdiction.255 The application of Montana to Cooley, a non-Indian involved in
suspected criminal activity, demonstrates that the Court might view Montana as an interchangeable test between civil and criminal jurisdiction.256
Though in conflict with Getches’s condemnation of the Court’s subjectivism in Federal Indian Law, the use of the Second Montana Exception could
still mark a positive point in Federal Indian Law precedent as it demonstrates the Court’s willingness to consider tribal interests in its determination of tribal authority over non-Indians.257
Up to this point, the Court has not used tribal interests as a strong
enough reason to assert tribal authority over non-Indians.258 In its previous
considerations of criminal jurisdiction, the Court held that the public safety
concerns of limiting criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians were analytically irrelevant.259 It specified that it hesitates to impose tribal regulation
251. Brief for Respondents at 25–26 n.13, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 579 U.S. 545 (2016) (No. 13-1496).
252. Dolgencorp, Inc., 746 F.3d at 178, 183 (Smith, C.J., dissenting).
253. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 579 U.S. 545 (2016).
254. See generally Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 657–59 (2001) (the Court rejected the Navajo Nation’s argument that a trading post had “direct effects” on the welfare of the Tribe
because it employed nearly 100 members of the Navajo Nation); Plains Com. Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008) (the Court found that the conduct must “imperil” the tribal
community suggesting an elevated threshold for the second Montana exception).
255. Reese, supra note 186.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See Atkinson Trading Co., 579 U.S. at 657–59; Plains Com. Bank, 554 U.S. at 341.
259. See Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191, 205 (1978); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693
(1990).
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over non-Indians due to a fear that non-Indians will be subject to jurisdictions where they have “no say.”260 But now, the Court has determined there
is a line for the Second Montana Exception, and that it will recognize the
health and welfare of tribes when non-Indians cross it.261
The Court conflated traditional criminal and civil tests of jurisdiction
to reach this decision.262 Thus, the Court extended Montana beyond cases
concerned strictly with civil issues to other situations that regard non-Indian
conduct on non-Indian owned land within Indian country that threaten the
health or welfare of a tribe.263 The Court found tribal police authority, not a
historically civil issue, fit the Second Montana Exception “almost like a
glove.”264 The Court also noted previous denials of tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians “rested in part,” not fully, on applying tribal laws to non-Indians.265 Potentially, this conflation of jurisdictional tests and acknowledgment that limits on tribal jurisdiction are not solely based on the “no say”
lawmaking logic may allow the Second Montana Exception to apply to additional criminal issues within Indian country.
With the decision in Cooley, the Court provided an example of what
might “sufficiently” affect a tribe to allow tribal oversight.266 The Court
considered the Second Montana Exception to apply in this instance because
tribes need to “protect themselves against ongoing threats.”267 Before advocates for the increased recognition of tribal sovereignty get too excited, the
Court did mention the limitations of the Montana Exceptions and that these
Exceptions cannot “swallow the rule.”268 It also noted that its recognition of
tribal authority in this instance did not raise the same concerns of prior
instances of imposing tribal authority over non-Indians.269 So a full-on return to complete criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is probably off the
table, at least for now. But the Court also stated that the Montana Exceptions “preserved the possibility that ‘certain forms of nonmember behavior’
may ‘sufficiently affect the tribe as to justify tribal oversight.’”270 By using
Montana to justify quasi-criminal regulation over a non-Indian, the Court
cracked open the door previously considered shut tight on tribal assertion of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
260. Plains Com. Bank, 554 U.S. at 337.
261. United States v. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. 1638, 1644–46 (2021); Reese, supra note 186.
262. Reese, supra note 186.
263. Cooley, 141 S. Ct. at 1643–46.
264. Id. at 1643.
265. Id. at 1644.
266. Id. at 1645.
267. Id. at 1643.
268. Id. at 1645 (citing Plains Com. Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330
(2008)).
269. Id. at 1644–45.
270. Id. at 1645 (citing Plains Com. Bank, 554 U.S. at 335).
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Moving forward, the application of the Second Montana Exception to
a quasi-criminal jurisdictional matter could be used to chip away at divested
authority and help reinstate some aspects of criminal jurisdiction. Future
Federal Indian Law cases might ask: What is an “on-going threat”? To what
extent do tribes need to be able to “protect themselves against ongoing
threats”? What criminal activity might “imperil” tribal interests? These inquiries, over time, could theoretically be used to wipe clean the twisted
logic behind the “no say” in lawmaking justification for hindering tribal
criminal jurisdiction.
With Cooley, Getches’s fear that the Court will continue to impose its
subjectivism on tribal interests has yet to be rectified. But the use of the
Second Montana Exception in Cooley might prove a remedy the Court can
use to acknowledge jurisdiction it should not have previously limited. The
Court can use its holding in Cooley to acknowledge that tribes retain the
inherent right to protect the health and welfare of themselves and their
members for civil, quasi-criminal, and criminal applications.
V. CONCLUSION
For better or for worse, the Court used Cooley to set precedent for the
Second Montana Exception. If used as originally intended, the foundations
of Federal Indian Law necessitated only an analysis of express limitation on
the tribal authority to police to find in favor of tribal sovereignty. However,
the Court’s newfound blurriness between civil and criminal jurisdiction
under Montana is not all bad, as it has reopened aspects of tribal jurisdiction previously considered lost. The decision in Cooley could either continue the Court’s misconceptions of retained tribal authority or it could be
used to promote tribal interests and, in a way, cure the defects of the
Court’s previous limitations on tribal jurisdiction.
Federal Indian Law practitioners should use the Cooley decision to
push the Court to rectify its previous limitations on tribal jurisdiction. If the
health and welfare of the tribe can be considered as justification to recognize tribal police authority, perhaps precedent can chip away at previously
rejected aspects of retained tribal sovereignty and eventually extend full
tribal criminal jurisdiction to non-Indians who threaten the health and welfare of tribes and tribal members.
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